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Acceleration Management:
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Melissa M. Appleyard, C. N. Berglund, Craig Peterson, Richard W. Smith
April 1, 2005
Abstract
In the recent generations of semiconductor devices, the semiconductor industry has been
accelerating towards the limits of the physical sciences. As a consequence, technology
managers in that industry face seven major challenges, which will threaten progress:
process, complexity, performance, power, density, productivity, and quality / reliability.
We believe that confronting these challenges requires a new approach to technology
management both within organizations and between organizations that form the backbone
of the industry. We call this new approach Acceleration Management.
Acceleration Management first requires that firms cultivate deep technical knowledge
and inspire creative solutions to seemingly insoluble technical problems. The second
stage of Acceleration Management requires the necessary expertise to be pooled, which
often demands inter-organizational cooperation. This paper explores these managerial
imperatives and analyzes how new semiconductor firms--particularly in China--have
created niches in the value chain even during a tumultuous time in the industry's history.
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I. Introduction
The semiconductor industry’s uncanny ability to abide by “Moore’s Law,” whereby
computing power has doubled roughly every 18 months, has transported the industry
from a laboratory curiosity to a $150 billion a year industry. In turn, the semiconductor
industry has driven the digital revolution of the last fifty years. At junctures along the
evolutionary path of semiconductor technology, technological challenges, labeled “show
stoppers,” have been encountered. Each time such a show stopper threatened to derail the
industry’s attainment of Moore’s Law, scientists and engineers from around the globe
devised clever solutions.
However, as the dimensionality of the circuitry has fallen to “nano” proportions (1
nanometer = one-billionth of a meter), the rate of change of technological challenges has
increased dramatically as we document in this paper. Additionally, the internal
architectures of chips have, in effect, changed direction. Because of these two
dimensions—an increase in the rate of technological change and a change in direction of
chip architecture—we label this a period of “acceleration” for the semiconductor
industry.
In the recent generations of semiconductor devices, the industry is accelerating towards
limits of the physical sciences. Moore’s Law addresses the physical dimensions of the
circuitry—as the circuitry has diminished in size, computing power has increased. This
relentless miniaturization had given rise to seven major challenges that are threatening to
derail the industry’s progress: Process, Complexity, Performance, Power, Density,
Productivity, and Quality and Reliability.
We believe that the acceleration of these challenges requires a new approach to
technology management both within organizations and between organizations that form
the backbone of the industry. We call this new approach to management: Acceleration
Management. Acceleration Management first requires that firms cultivate deep technical
knowledge and inspire creative solutions to seemingly insoluble technical problems. The
second stage of Acceleration Management requires the necessary expertise to be pooled,
which often demands inter-organizational cooperation. This paper explores these
managerial imperatives and analyzes how new semiconductor firms—particularly in
China—have created niches in the value chain even during such a tumultuous time in the
industry’s history.
II. Literature Overview of High-Velocity Environments
Previous studies have examined how significant strategic decisions are made in “highvelocity” environments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Weber,
2002). These environments resemble the environment portrayed in this paper—lots of
uncertainty attributable to technology change, demand fluctuations, the competitive
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landscape, and regulatory decisions. These studies find that, contrary to prior work in
low-velocity settings, a greater quantity of high quality information is processed in
shorter time periods by the most successful firms. Furthermore, the successful rapid
decision makers use rational decision-making processes and exhibit a greater level of
innovativeness.
While some of these findings appear paradoxical—more information used in a short time
period for more innovative strategic decisions—they reflect the importance of speed and
leadership in high-velocity environments. As these authors point out, a number of
business strategies—like an imitation strategy or a fast follower strategy—could lead to
bankruptcy. Market saturation by close substitutes or time delays in product release can
prove detrimental.
III. Defining Acceleration Management
Acceleration is defined at the rate of change of velocity in a particular time interval. For
velocity to change, speed can change or direction can change. We find both types of
changes in this stage of the semiconductor industry’s evolution. To characterize the
change in speed, we focus on the change in the rate of technological change. We first
describe how the industry’s velocity has been characterized by Moore’s Law. We then
describe the 7 primary dimensions along which the speed of technological change has
increased.
As for the other aspect of acceleration—a change in direction—we analyze how new
generations of chips contain novel architectures. While these new architectures appear to
“change direction” from previous chip generations, they keep the industry on track to
achieve Moore’s Law. That is to say that chip performance in terms of computing power
is not sacrificed even though the inner-workings of the new chips are quite distinctive.
The Bourgeois and Eisenhardt studies in high-velocity environments mentioned above
examined strategic decision-making in the early days of the minicomputer industry. In
contrast, our setting is a period of maturity in the semiconductor industry. While
maturity may connote stability, the technological challenges that are arising have led the
industry to be anything but stable. This instability has led to an acceleration of
challenges that merit managerial attention and present new opportunities to potential
entrants into the industry.
IV. Abiding by Moore’s Law Historically
The semiconductor industry’s ability to traverse the high-velocity environment of the past
is reflected in its adherence to Moore’s Law. The semiconductor industry’s unique
ability to double the electronic function on a chip roughly every two years while
profitably selling these chips at approximately the same price has driven the industry
since 1970 as illustrated in Figure 1. However a very significant increase in the pace of

3

change occurred starting in the mid-1990s. This increase occurred even though the
complexity of the product design and manufacturing, as well as the costs of equipment
and facilities, were also increasing dramatically. We believe the reason the industry was
able to profitably abide by Moore’s Law has been because of improvements in the way
they managed this rapid technological change, what we call acceleration management.
The companies best able to accelerate the profitable introduction and volume
manufacturing of new technology gained enormous competitive advantage (Appleyard, et
al., 2000; Macher, et al., 1998).
Because of the increased rate of new technology introduction since the 1990s,
accompanied by the increasing complexity of the manufacturing and design processes,
management issues began to become more important relative to technical issues for the
industry. A widely accepted process technology roadmap was central to such
management and was created and tracked based on the universally recognized Moore’s
Law illustrated in Figure 1.
Since the early 1990s, this roadmap, the International Technology Roadmap for
Semiconductors (ITRS), has provided the schedule for alignment across chip companies,
equipment suppliers, and support industries (Kostoff and Schaller, 2001). An additional
and unintended effect of the roadmap was impetus for further acceleration as companies
recognized the competitive advantage from beating the published schedule. In fact every
update to the roadmap since 1994 has seen a further acceleration relative to the
previously published one. Some of these roadmaps and their updates are shown in Figure
2.
The rate of increase in chip density reflected in the ITRS roadmap was limited initially by
the industry’s ability to improve production yield. By the late 1980s the rate of yield
improvement in new manufacturing processes and the high mature process yields that
were then attained, led to an increasing emphasis on productivity and a corresponding
increasing emphasis on reducing the time to introduce new manufacturing processes.
These trends gave rise to managerial imperatives namely yield management and pacesetting development activities.
This acceleration of new technology introduction could not occur in isolation within a
particular semiconductor company, but required that the semiconductor support and
infrastructure segments, such as semiconductor equipment and mask making, to increase
their rate of new technology introductions apace.1 If an equipment company could not
keep up with the rapid new process introductions of the chip companies, they would be
replaced. Managing multi-firm coordination has, therefore, become a hallmark of
acceleration management.
A management trend during the 1980s and early 1990s, was the decision to “in-source”
high value-added capabilities like mask making. Chip companies turned away from
external mask-making suppliers. Instead, they either began to acquire their own mask
1

“Masks” contain the picture of the circuitry that is transferred onto the silicon wafer to make the
semiconductor device.
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shops or create consortia mask facilities with other semiconductor companies with
similar needs. The reason for this reversal was that the external mask suppliers found it
increasingly difficult to profitably supply leading-edge masks in a timely enough manner
to the chip companies during the crucial stage of new process development.
The managerial capabilities noted above—yield management; pace-setting; multi-firm
coordination; and in-sourcing—helped to distinguish the leading semiconductor firms.
By the 1990s, as acceleration increased, an overarching managerial imperative became
how to cultivate “disciplined creativity.” Disciplined creativity was characterized by
balancing a long-range plan for technology and manufacturing planning with short-term
decisions that were consistent with that plan. Next generation production process
development could be made easier and faster if the current chip generation process was
constrained for most synergy with the subsequent generation. While the industry
generally carried out long-range planning from its inception, the strategy and
management implementation of this planning greatly improved at the leading companies
since the early 1990s.
Supporting disciplined creativity was the adoption of better methodologies and
procedures for developing new processes and introducing them into volume production.
The well-known “copy exactly” methodology pioneered by Intel for new manufacturing
processes was one example of such a methodology. Equally striking methodological
improvements have been implemented at leading companies over the past decade
covering design, design aids, mask-making, process development, yield management,
process verification/qualification, and testing.
V. The Technological Challenges behind the Shift from a High-Velocity to an
Acceleration Environment
The semiconductor industry’s ability to abide by Moore’s Law started to be called into
question in the late 1990s largely due to the technological challenges that were on the
horizon. Even though the industry successfully cleared technological hurdles in the past,
the looming challenges were thought to be increasingly insurmountable.
Seven Scaling Challenges
Miniaturization has reached an inflection point by 2005. Effects of technology
acceleration are visible when looking at the exponentially emerging challenges of
computer chip design as the semiconductor industry moves from one silicon process
generation to the next. Problems with conventional design flows began to emerge with
the 0.35 micron process generation. The difficulties arose because of fundamental
physical realities that affect design and manufacturing as processes scale to smaller sizes.
With each new process generation, factors that were previously only second- or thirdorder effects have emerged as significant issues. Figure 3 depicts the accelerating
emergence of these design issues.
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Advancing from one process generation to the next introduced above is only one
dimension of semiconductor product scaling. The six other dimensions of scaling, each
of which has also significantly compounded the challenge of semiconductor design and
product development, are: power consumption management; cost reduction and control;
product complexity; performance improvement; development productivity; and quality
and reliability. These accelerating challenges analyzed below are changing not only how
engineers design and oversee manufacturing but also how companies need to organize
and manage to continue bringing successful new products to market.
Product development challenges resulting from process advancement
Imagine an assembly line in a factory. As chip process generations became more
advanced over time, the amount of work performed at a “station” increased. At the 0.25
micron process generation, the conveyor belt between stations slowed down (or got
longer) because of increasing resistance and capacitance. This resulted in the
“interconnect wires” between logic gates leading to as much as 20% to 80% of the delay
across the logic path. The net effect starting at 0.25 micron was that many product
developments were delayed due to difficulties learning how to compensate for
interconnect delays.
In the 0.18 micron process generation, interconnect complexity increased and two other
significant design challenges emerged: signal integrity and power integrity. The remedy
for overcoming interconnect delays that required modification to the interconnect wires,
actually led to a new problem: capacitive coupling. Capacitive coupling between signals
meant that one signal could potentially electrically couple to an adjacent signal and
corrupt its intended data value. New methods to detect and reduce these signal integrity
violations were required.
The increased resistance required to ease the interconnect delays also effected the
distribution of power across chips. Without new power integrity checks, semiconductors
could suffer power drops that would reduce the intended performance of the design,
something akin to a power brown-out.
In the next generation, 0.13 micron, the intensity of the aforementioned design challenges
increased. For example, the average number of signal integrity violations for a given
design grew from 30 to about 300 for the 0.13 micron process. At the same time, three
new significant design challenges emerged: “in-die variation,” increased leakage power,
and the corruption of memory cells.
The first new concern at 0.13 micron was in-die variation. Prior to 0.13 micron, designers
could be comfortable that all the circuits on one chip, or “die,” would have the same
process characteristics. Consistency of operation across the chip yielded benefits to the
designer: one could predict consistent assembly time in the “factory.” Starting with
0.13, the process variation of transistor strengths between different portions of the same
chip started to vary significantly. The assembly line was no longer predictable!
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This complicated the design of clock timing trees. Variations in transistor strength across
each die made it more challenging to support a common clock domain. Now, the
engineer had to design the chip to be tolerant of logic functions being skewed in timing
across different areas of the chip. Portions of the chip that logically operate on the same
clock had to be broken into separate clock domains and linked via well-controlled timing
interfaces.
The second new challenge was the increase of leakage power. Previously, the power
consumed by a chip was primarily associated with the speed of operation and amount of
logic computation that occurred at one time. This is called the active power. Leakage
power is power that is consumed even when a circuit is at rest. Transistor gates act
electrically like water faucets providing current to a digital signal line; however, these
water faucets never completely turn off. This leakage power had previously been so
small that it was not a big concern.
In the 0.13 micron generation, an 8x increase in leakage power occurred. Leakage power
became a component of overall chip power—potentially as much as 20 to 30 percent of
chip’s power consumption. To provide engineers with a means of reducing leakage
power, process engineers created two types of transistors: one which scaled performance
normally, but leaked a lot of power and another that was slower, but leaked 10 times less
power. To manage power consumption during the design process, engineers needed to
learn how to optimize power and use slower, low-leakage transistors where appropriate.
Only some companies today have effective and efficient means to utilize both types of
transistors in a design. Leakage power will continue to increase by a factor of about 8x
across future process generations.
The final significant design issue to emerge on the 0.13 micron process generation was
due to shrinking on-chip memories. As on-chip memories fell in size, the amount of
electrical energy required to sustain the knowledge in a memory cell decreased
exponentially. In 0.13 micron and 90 nanometer generations, memory cells contain such
a small level of energy that they can be upset and change state if hit by periodic atomic
alpha particles that are emitted by most natural materials. The more memory required in
a given design, the higher the probability that a memory cell can be hit by one of these
particles. This phenomenon is a huge concern because data integrity must be maintained.
Engineers need to take measures that enable a design to operate properly even if memory
cells become corrupted.
The design challenges mentioned above are side effects of semiconductor process
scaling. Their complexity is accelerating and new issues emerge with every process
generation. There are six additional dimensions of scaling that are also experiencing
acceleration of issues that have to be solved to successfully bring new semiconductor
designs to market.
Power consumption management
In the market place for portable devices, the ability to extend battery life is a key
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competitive differentiator. The challenge to manage power during the development
process is actually much larger. Each new process generation drives reduction of power
supply voltage and cuts the power available for a given design virtually in half. At the
same time, companies design, develop, and introduce products that are more capable and
have many new features. As a result, it is common to see twice the amount of logic in
new semiconductor devices. This in turn doubles the power consumed. Designs are also
required to be faster. If the frequency is increased 50%, the power required is also
increased by 50%. Add the increase in leakage power noted in the previous section and
total power may increase another 50%. The challenge of making products more power
efficient has dramatically increased the development challenge.
This issue is even more complex. Due to increasing power in smaller spaces, new
technology to cool the devices must be continually innovated, applied, and adapted.
Significant mechanical engineering capability is required to enable the continued scaling
of electronic devices. Many higher performance devices today have exceeded the
thermal density of a standard kitchen hot plate in number of watts dissipated per square
centimeter. Many people complain about how hot laptop computers feel on their laps.
This thermal density will continue to increase over time.
Cost reduction and control
The cost to develop new semiconductor devices has been increasing over time. Managers
must manage the risks associated with new product development to ensure adequate rates
of return. Today, engineering costs to initially develop a complex product can be in the
$10M ballpark for 0.13 micron products and in the $20M range for 90 nanometer
products. With each new process generation, the chip area needed to implement the same
design is reduced in half. This is an obvious benefit. On the other hand, the cost of
making a set of masks is roughly doubling every process generation. Mask costs were
about $300K on the 0.18 micron process generation. At 0.13, mask costs were
approximately $600K. 90 nanometer masks cost roughly $1.3M and 60nm masks started
in the $2.4M range.
Another critical cost consideration has emerged with increasing complexity. The cost of
resources required for functionally validating that a design is free from bugs has emerged
to be one of the largest burdens on product development. Debugging now commonly
takes from one to two times the number of engineers as it does to design the functionality
of a semiconductor device. In addition, trends showing that products are less likely to
meet performance requirements on the “first silicon.” Bug fixing, revalidation and
retooling can cost as much as half the initial design.
Many semiconductor products today have a life span of about three years and generate
$5M to $10M in revenue with margins ranging from 20% to 60% or more. Over time,
fewer products will be economically feasible as processes advance. To make matters
more complicated, product life cycles for many consumer products are shrinking. Cell
phones are a perfect example of this trend.
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Complexity dimension
With the ability to put twice the function and features on the same chip area with each
new process generation, design complexity is exponentially growing. One of the
challenging questions is how to use this additional silicon floor space to make products
more exciting and also how to stay within emerging design constraints and challenges.
For those that are looking at the power issues described above, they ask how exciting
products can be built by increasing the ratio of memory on a chip in the place of logic.
Doubling logic will tend to double the power, but power does not increase even linearly
with the addition of more memory.
A significant driver of processor design overtime has been the focus on how to execute a
“single code stream” faster. This led to accelerating complexity for incrementally more
performance. It started with reducing the time to execute an instruction from multiple
clocks to one clock; then to pipelining multiple memory accesses in parallel; then to
executing multiple instructions per clock in parallel; then to hardware support for
switching between more than one stream of code; then to even predicting in advance
what instructions might be executed and executing them while waiting for a slower
operation in case they would be used. All this creates an exponential increase in
complexity that has to be validated and adds to development time.
Performance improvement challenges
Increasing a products performance frequency enables a product to do more in the same
amount of time, which enables creating new excitement in future products. While each
new process generation provides a performance improvement of about 30%, certain types
of products try to sustain performance increases of two times over the prior generation.
The additional performance gains beyond those offered by a new process generation
require even greater tradeoffs and complexity. One type of performance improvement
relies on the implementation of a given logic function with less serial logic between logic
clocks, in other words more parallelism.
While parallelism shortens time to execute, it can significantly add to the amount of logic
to perform a given function, thus adding to the validation effort. In addition, fewer gates
between timing clocks result in a host of circuit issues to deal with. One such issues is
called “hold time” that adds to the complexity of the low level design. Also, because the
amount of logic operating in parallel for a given function, it exacerbates the power
consumed by the device. These are only a few examples of the things that are affected by
increasing performance. So pushing performance adds to the inflections that are
occurring in all of the other scaling dimensions.
Development productivity, time to market, and product lifetime challenges
To minimize the time to turn out ever more complicated products, there are strategic
changes that need to be taken by companies. Some previous examples include increasing
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use of modules that are designed to be reused on more than one design. This has lead to
the emergence of a significant 3rd party intellectual property (IP) industry that specializes
in making these “IPs.” Because of the existence of this third party industry, small design
houses can compete with larger traditional design companies, which have a lot of
resources to develop their own modules. Some estimate that by 2007, as much as 80% of
an average chip may consist of reusable IP blocks.
The EDA tool industry is continually trying to keep up with capabilities that support
automation of best-known techniques. This implies an increasing amount of accumulated
tool capability, as well as required maintenance. At the same time neither the number of
customers nor the pools of money, which can be extracted from the industry for CAD
tools, is increasing rapidly.
Quality, reliability, and design for manufacturability challenges
With the increasing complexity of advance process manufacturing, the yield of good die
on a wafer started to be dominated by systematic failures after the 0.25 micron process.
A new inflection has emerged in the effort to maximize yield of good die on a silicon
wafer. One approach is to distinguish the areas of a design that are critical to performance
or operation. In those areas, one uses normal scaled design rules. However, in other
areas, relaxing certain design rules can enhance the yield by increasing margins of error.
This is one example of new types of “design for manufacturability” methods that need to
be adopted to increase competitiveness.
Today, there is significant technology being developed to support improved chip
performance by analyzing in-die variation effects on timing via statistical analysis
methods. This type of analysis can enable trade-offs between yield and performance.
VI. Change in Direction: the Dual Core Architecture
A company’s strategic direction needs to be reevaluated more frequently as the rate of
change of technology accelerates. A salient example of this can be seen in recent
changes on how to use silicon to increase microprocessor performance. For 30 years,
microprocessor performance has been driven by applying more of the increasing silicon
area to speed the execution of a single stream of application code. Initially,
microprocessors took several clock cycles to execute a single instruction. Then came
Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) technology that proved the performance
benefit of executing an instruction in a single cycle. RISC techniques were incorporated
in all types of processors.
Then came pipelining memory accesses to reduce the performance impact of slow
memory access times and to overcome processor bus bandwidth. This was followed by
the execution of multiple instructions in parallel called Superscalar Execution. Out of
order execution followed, which enabled instructions to stall briefly while the hardware
would make a good guess at the next instruction needed and would go ahead and execute
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if not immediately dependent on the stalled result. This is a very simplified list of the
advances that propelled each generation’s performance at a faster rate than could be
delivered through process improvements alone. Each of these advances required more
than doubling the amount of transistors in each microprocessor to increase performance.
However, in roughly the last five years, it has been recognized that the resulting power
increase to meet this rate of “single stream” performance increase will not be sustainable
with out running into power limitations that are sometimes referred to as “The Power
Wall.” Avoiding the Power Wall has lead to a recent strategy change across the industry
of pushing performance through the faster execution of multiple code streams.
Multiple code streams were first implemented with Multi-Treaded execution. More
recently this approach is being implemented by putting two or more processor cores on a
chip at the same time. The shift from increasing speed through a single code stream to
now putting multiple processor cores on a single chip is a significant strategy change
motivated by practicality, development efficiency, and technological changes.
VII. Implications of Acceleration: Impact on Business Model Evolution
In the semiconductor industry, the rate of change of technology challenges are driving
business model changes at an increasing rate. Companies are focusing on developing
their areas of strength and outsourcing other aspects to fulfill their product development
requirements in light of the technical demands examined in this article.
For example, a traditional application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) company used to
have its own production facility, its own library of IP, its own reusable IP blocks, and
developed its own CAD tools. In the last 15 years, the need for this integrated structure
has been dismantled. Instead of building and managing their own production facility,
ASIC companies now regularly work with world-class contract manufacturers, or
foundries. Foundries have emerged across Asia, including TSMC and UMC in Taiwan
and Chartered Semiconductor in Singapore. Independent assembly and test companies
also have sprung up to support this new dis-integrated structure.
Also in the last 15 years, independent CAD companies have emerged which could offer
smaller companies with the ability to buy/license their own tools and afterward have their
products fabricated at an independent foundry. This has given rise to the “fabless”
semiconductor industry.
The rise of the foundries and CAD companies opened up business opportunities for a
whole new segment of the industry—independent IP companies. These companies
follow a business model focused on developing large, predesigned and reusable building
blocks (IPs) that a fabless company can purchase to speed the development of a chip.2
Many predict that an average chip design in 2007 will be roughly 80% predesigned and
2

Reusable means that the building block can be easily integrated into many different designs as compared
with the older approach of designing each function into a customized chip.
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reusable building blocks. The availability of these building blocks—many of which used
to be system level components—has given way to the concept of building a System-Ona-Chip (SOC).
This changing landscape also supported the growth of another complementary industry
during the last 10 years—the fabless design house, or “backend” design service. The
dynamics leading to the rise of backend design services included the fact that physical
design tools became increasingly expensive, as well as the design process becoming
increasingly challenging as noted in this article. The backend physical design portion of
a product could take on average a few weeks up to a few months to complete. Unless a
product company was developing a lot of products each year and could keep a physical
design team busy, the cost of the design tools has become prohibitively expensive to
support a physical design team in-house. Further, because the technology has been
changing so rapidly, if a company does not have their design team doing physical design
all the time, they would rapidly become out of date and could not sustain the ability to
develop designs with good quality on predictable schedules.
This change paved the way for a more recently expanding industry during the last 5 to 6
years of the fabless backend physical design service industry or fabless ASIC companies.
While there were companies of this type before, the last 5 years has seen expanded
interest and funding of these types of businesses by venture capital companies. This
trend also has been fueled by a view that a decreasing percentage of companies in the
future will have the expertise level to keep up with the escalating design challenges
outlined in this article. This suggests the possibility of a dramatic increase in demand for
these services.
Since the burst of the dot com bubble, companies have looked for ways to cut costs more
intensely this has led to outsourcing in lower cost geographies like China and India.
Whereas it took Taiwan over a decade to build a world-class semiconductor industry
based upon developing the semiconductor foundry business, it may take China only 5
years to develop companies with similar semiconductor manufacturing volumes. With
technological capability in China quickly rising due to strong domestic universities, the
return of Chinese engineers who had worked internationally, and an expanded venture
capital interest, design foundries are on the rise in China. In addition to design services, a
design foundry may also provide “turnkey” manufacturing through supply chain
management. Design foundries have reduced the design process to a systematic
operation—design “art” has given way to “factory-like” science. This increases
efficiency, further reduces cost, and allows entry points for new players. In China, one
could anticipate that these operations may become quite large based upon the readily
available and expanding workforce that is growing in expertise at a very rapid rate. The
economics of these design foundries can support a design-only business, allowing the
customer to decide among manufacturing options. This will create a disruptive factor in
the U.S. market where many product companies are once again wanting to manage the
manufacturing supply chain themselves as a way of increasing their product margin in
this post dot com era.
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With the escalation of technology challenges described in this article, semiconductor
companies are increasingly working together through alliances to overcome these
roadblocks. One recent example saw four industry powerhouses working together to
develop a 90nm generation design flow. TSMC (the leading foundry), Artisan (a leading
library supplier), Cadence (one of the top two EDA companies), and ARM (a leading
embedded processor and related IP company) worked together to develop this design
flow. The flow could then be used by other companies wanting to successfully develop
90nm products that would be fabricated in TSMC’s production facilities.
This trend toward specialized firms interacting in a highly collaborative way is consistent
with the Open Innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003). In discussions with venture
capitalists, we have heard recent acceptance of this multi-party approach to innovation
because of the need to combine capabilities required to offer a complete and competitive
semiconductor product. We anticipate that the Open Innovation approach will not only
be used between companies that offer different parts of a solution, but also by
competitors that collaborate to offer improved products that benefit from the synergistic
combination of the unique core competencies of each company.
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Fig. 1 Trend in the number of transistors on state-of-the-art logic chips from 1970 through 2005
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Fig. 2 The ITRS Roadmaps for 1994, 1997, and 1998/99

ITRS Roadmap Acceleration
500

95

97

02

05

08

11

14

11

14

1994

350
Minimum Feature Size (nm)

99

250

1997

180

1998 & 1999

130
100

Best Case
Opportunity

70
50
35
25

MPU Gate

IRC
Agreement
July 7, 1999
95

97

DRAM Half Pitch
99

02

05

08

Source: http://www.sematech.org/resources/ief/meetings/200011/itrs.pdf
16

Fig. 3

Source: Craig Peterson, IPCore Technologies.

17

